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Abstract. This paper presents preliminary results of utilization of Event-B for
domain modeling. The development of new urban transport systems, based on
autonomous vehicles, strongly requires the formal description of land transporta-
tion domain. Certification, safety, or security, for instance, crucially depend upon
formal assessment that systems meet the required properties and constraints of
the domain. Though Event-B has not been designed for domain modeling, yet,
it was discovered that its notions of events and non determinism are well suited
to formalize a domain with many autonomous agents. Refinements and system-
atically constructed proof obligations work well in this context, but we also need
other operations in the modeling process, such as, "abstraction leaps" which have
been introduced as a part of domain specification.
1 Introduction
Having good understanding of an application domain is a crucial prerequisite to de-
velop software within that domain [1]. The understanding of domain is referred to as
domain model. A domain model is a conceptual model of a system which describes var-
ious entities, phenomena and their inter-relationships, along with their important static
and dynamic properties, related to a particular domain. The domain model may be ex-
pressed in the form of requirements, specifications, or architectural references. Gen-
erally, a domain model is used to verify and validate the understanding of a problem
domain captured by different stakeholders of the domain [2] [3].
In order to be useful for software development and reusability, domain models
should be captured and specified in some systematic way [4]. One systematic procedure
to specify domain models is the use of formal methods. Though formal methods seem
to be tiresome because of their time consumption and extensive manual efforts, yet,
studies have proved their cost effectiveness as they minimize defects in earlier stages of
software development [5].
According to [6], if domain models and requirements of software are not formally
expressed, software correctness can not be meaningfully achieved. Safety is also one of
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the French National Research Agency TACOS
project, ANR-06-SETI-017 (http://tacos.loria.fr) and by the pôle de compétitivité
Alsace/Franche-Comté CRISTAL project (http://www.projet-cristal.net).
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the major factors which can not be overlooked while designing complex and critical sys-
tems. The development of correct and safe systems can be difficult and error prone with
traditional software development methods. However, use of formal methods, in order
to ensure their correctness and to structure their development from domain modeling to
implementation, can significantly help system development.
B [7] is a formal method, having good tool support, which allows a stepwise devel-
opment of modeling and reasoning about sequential programs. It has proved its strength
in industry with the development of complex real-life applications in transportation do-
main, such as, the Roissy VAL [8]. Event-B [9] is an evolution of the B method, provid-
ing new mechanisms for developing large reactive and distributed systems. We already
have an experience [10] of using Event-B for specification and development of situated
Multi-Agents Systems and its application to platooning problem. Some other related
work has been presented in [11,12] and [13] to demonstrate and refine the techniques
of specification and safety analysis for the case study on automated freeways.
In this paper, we propose the use of Event-B for domain modeling, even though
it has not been designed for this purpose, yet, we think, the technique of expression
of abstract model based systems and their refinements using events is also suitable for
domain modeling. We apply this technique to the transportation domain for the devel-
opment of a new type of urban vehicle.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Event-B
approach. Section 3 describes main entities necessary for transportation domain. Sec-
tion 4 provides a stepwise Event-B specification of this domain. Section 5 presents the
hierarchy of the Event-B model with three levels of abstraction. Finally, sect. 6 presents
some preliminary lessons learned from this experience of formal domain modeling and
suggests further directions for future work.
2 Basic Concepts of Event-B
Event-B [9] is a formal language for modeling and reasoning about systems. It is an
evolution of classical B [7] for developing reactive and distributed systems. The Rodin
platform 1 provides the tool support for Event-B.
Like classical B, the concept of refinement is the heart and soul of Event B. Systems
are incrementally refined from abstract models to more concrete models while preserv-
ing correctness. The proof based development paradigm ensures the model correctness
because each development includes proof obligations for invariants and refinement.
In an Event-B model, data is distributed between contexts and machines depend-
ing upon the nature of the data. A context holds the static data of the model. It is com-
posed of sets, constants, axioms, and theorems. A machine holds the dynamic
data of the model. In a machine variables, invariants, variants, theorems, and
events are specified. Proof obligations are automatically generated to ensure the con-
sistency of the model related to each context and machine.
The events in Event-B substitute the operations of classical B. Unlike operations,
events are not called but observed. An event consists of guards and a body. When
1 RODIN(Rigorous Open Development Environment for Complex Systems) is an EU funded
research project IST511599 (http://rodin.cs.ncl.ac.uk)
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the guards are evaluated to true, the event is triggered; it modifies the system state by
executing actions on state variables. When the guards of several events are evaluated
to true, choice of triggering event is non-deterministic. Initialization is an event
that must appear into each Event-B machine. This event is used to initialize the state
variables of the machine.
Both machines and contexts can be refined. A context can extend (refine) several
contexts. Machines can see contexts, which allow events to refer to the static data of the
model. A machine can refine only one other machine. An abstract event can be refined
into several concrete ones; several abstract events can be merged into one concrete
event.
The idea of decomposition allows the splitting of an Event-B model into smaller
components to manage the increasing complexity of the design. The variables of the
model are divided into external and internal variables. The internal variables only cor-
respond to one component whereas external variables can be manipulated by all com-
ponents. Events referring only to the internal variables of a component are placed in the
same component. Other events which refer both internal and external variables appear
in the component which reference the internal variables.
3 Transportation Domain Model
This work is part of the TACOS and the CRISTAL projects which are concerned about
the development of a new type of urban transport systems based on autonomous vehi-
cles, known as CyCabs [14].
The term "transportation" refers to the movement of people or goods by vehicles
from locations to locations [6]. Many important concepts appear in this definition of
transportation, which must be addressed during the transportation domain description,
such as vehicles, locations, movement, and etc. Following are the intrinsic concepts of
the transportation domain which relate to the movement of vehicle:
3.1 Locations
Each vehicle captures a location at any given moment. In this work, a location refers to
a logical localization of a vehicle in contrast to its physical localization on geographical
coordinates.
3.2 Nets, Hubs and Connections
We assume a transportation system which consists of several interconnected networks.
One network is constituted of a set of hubs connected through connections. A hub is
an abstraction of a place where a vehicle can stop such as stations, junctions, and etc.
Connection is an abstraction of a directed road link between two hubs.
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3.3 Junctions and Stations
We consider two kinds of hubs: junctions and stations. Junctions model road intersec-
tions and other crossings where safety requires special attention. Stations models places
where passengers can come on and off vehicles, and where vehicles can be parked. Sta-
tions, and not junctions, are valid destinations of a travel.
3.4 Paths and Routes
Operative connections between hubs are built on top of a physical network. At a physi-
cal level, adjacent hubs are connected through paths, which are, in fact, directed edges
connecting these vertices. A connection will then often be realized as a sequence of
paths, which is called a route. Figure 1 shows a net with hubs and paths (directed con-
nections).
Fig. 1. A Net with Hubs and paths
3.5 Properties
Beside the general description of a road network, the desired properties of a transporta-
tion domain are also to be specified. In this paper, we consider the collision avoidance
property. The term collision refers to the situation when two vehicles are at the same
place at the same time. Until now, we have only considered collisions at intersections
(which, by the way, represent the majority of collisions in real life). To express the
non-collision property, we introduce the notion of capacity of a hub, which represents
the maximum number of vehicles which can share the hub simultaneously. A collision
occurs if load of the hub exceeds its capacity. This same notion of capacity also enables
us to model the fact that station can only admit a finite number of vehicles.
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4 Stepwise Development of the Model
Now the objective is to model the movement of a vehicle from one location (origin) to
another (destination). The model is specified into three levels of abstraction. Level 1
specifies the traveling of a vehicle from one hub (origin) to another (destination). Level
2 states that, in order to travel from origin to destination, a vehicle must traverse all
intermediate hubs and connections thus decomposing the travel event into crossHub
and traversePath events. Level 3 specifies the crossHub event into more details and
further decomposes it into enterHub, leaveHub and wait events. These levels of ab-
straction are shown by Fig. 2. Notice that traversePath event is not elaborated at this
stage as only hub locations of vehicle are being considered for this work.
Fig. 2. Three Levels of abstraction
These three levels of abstraction have been specified using the stepwise develop-
ment technique of Event-B. Each abstraction level may be comprised of one or more
refinement steps. The concepts of abstraction and refinement should not be confused
with each other. Refinement is a technical Event-B process in which each step adds
further details to the model until it is meaningfully refined, however abstraction refers
to the thought process in which initially a global view of some observable phenomenon
is envisioned and later more details to the phenomenon are integrated with the passage
of time. Following are the series of Event-B refinements.
4.1 Initial Model
The basic definition of movement is "change in position". Machine Movement0, shown
by Fig. 3, specifies this fact in an abstract event, known as travel, in which a vehicle
changes its current position to a new position. The position of a vehicle is specified
with a variable location. An invariant is specified over this variable which states that
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a vehicle can hold any GlobalLocation over a net. As this is an abstract event, so, it
does not specify any further information about the movement of a vehicle. This machine
sees the context StartState, shown by Fig. 4, which initializes locations of vehicles.
MACHINE Movement0
SEES
StartState
VARIABLES
location
INVARIANTS
inv1 location ∈ Vehicles → GlobalLocations
EVENTS
INITIALISATION =̂
BEGIN
act1 location := startVehicleLocation
END
travel =̂
ANY
vehicle
newLocation
WHERE
grd1 vehicle ∈ Vehicles
grd2 newLocation ∈ GlobalLocations
grd3 newLocation 6= location(vehicle)
THEN
act1 location (vehicle):=newLocation
END
END
Fig. 3. Initial machine
CONTEXT
StartState
EXTENDS
Location
CONSTANTS
startVehicleLocation
AXIOMS
type1 startVehicleLocation ∈
Vehicles → GlobalLocations
END
Fig. 4. Context StartState
To specify the general transportation domain constructs, such as, nets, hubs, and
connections, a context Net, shown by Fig. 5, is also modeled. Three types of axioms
have been used in this context: typing axioms, which set the type of the constants,
property axioms, which specify the constraints and properties of the constants, and
technical axioms, which specify the technical axioms required for proof obligations.
A net consists of several hubs and connections. This fact is represented in the model
for a hub with the help of a relation between a set of hubs and nets (type1) and for a con-
nection with the help of a total function between a set of connections and nets (type2).
A hub may be shared among several nets (prop7), however, a connection always be-
longs to only one net (prop6). ConnectedHubs is a constant which specifies those two
hubs which are connected to each other by a particular connection (type3). This re-
lation is further decomposed into two distinct relations i.e., connectionOrigin and
connectionDestination. Former (type5) describes the origin hub for the connection
and later (type6) refers to the destination of the connection.The constant hubConnection
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(type4) refers to the fact that each hub has one or more connections attached to it i.e.,
disconnected hubs are not possible in domain. It is also stated that both, hub and connec-
tion, linked to each other, should belong to the same net (prop3). Reflexive connections
are not permitted in the domain so both the origin and destination hubs of the connec-
tions should be different (prop4). A hub might be shared between two or more nets
(type7). Each net is consisted of at least two hubs and one connection (prop10).
4.2 First Refinement
The goal of this first refinement step is to add more constraints to the basic travel
event: a movement is now seen as as a change in position from one hub to another.
Since in our model only hubs can be the starting and ending points of the vehicles, so
in our opinion, this is the next logical step we should take. Now, it is specified that the
vehicle moves from one hub to another. The vehicle changes its location from origin
hub to destination hub as a consequence of this event. Figure 6 shows the refined travel
event.
4.3 Second Refinement
Vehicles in transportation domain follow a route to reach their destination from the
origin. This fact is the basis to introduce this refinement step. In this refinement, it is
assumed that starting position of the vehicle is somewhere on the origin of the route
and destination of the vehicle is the last hub of the route. In other words, a vehicle is
moving along a route in this refinement from origin to destination hub. Figure 7 shows
the added refinement in the travel event.
To facilitate movement of vehicle anywhere on a net following a route, another
context has been introduced at this level. This context Net2 specifies the concept of
paths and routes. Route, which is also a type of connection, is specified as a sequence
of paths. All sequences of paths are not routes, but only those sequences whose both
connectionOrigin and connectionDestination are stations and all intermediate
hubs and connections can be traversed in order to reach destination.
4.4 Third Refinement
This refinement corresponds to the second level of abstraction of the model. Here, a
model is witnessing an abstraction leap. Previous refinement stated that a vehicle travels
from origin hub to destination hub following a route. Naturally, during a route, a vehicle
must traverse many intermediate hubs and paths, in order, to reach its destination. Thus,
modeling the phenomena of crossing hubs and traversing paths is the main reason for
this abstraction leap because these phenomena add further more details to our thought
process of how a vehicle travels.
In this refinement, three new events crossHub, traversePath, and startTravel
are added. The rationale for introducing the events traversePath and crossHub is
to facilitate the travel event in crossing hubs and traversing paths. CrossHub and
traversePath are the convergent events and are decompositions of the travel event.
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CONTEXT
Net
SETS
Nets
Hubes
Connections
CONSTANTS
obsNetHubs
obsNetConnections
connectedHubs
hubConnections
connectionOrigin
connectionDestination
areConnectedHubs
isSharedHub
AXIOMS
tech1 finite (Nets)
tech2 finite (Hubs)
tech3 finite (Connections)
type1 obsNetHubs ∈ Hubs ↔ Nets
type2 obsNetConnections ∈ Connections → Nets
prop1 dom(obsNetHubs) = Hubs ∧ ran(obsNetHubs) = Nets
prop2 dom(obsNetConnections) = Connections ∧ ran(obsNetConnections) = Nets
type3 connectedHubs ∈ Connections → Hubs × Hubs
type4 hubConnections ∈ Hubs → P1(Connections)
type5 connectionOrigin ∈ Connections → Hubs
type6 connectionDestination ∈ Connections → Hubs
prop3 ∀c · c ∈ Connections ⇒ obsNetConnections[{c}] ⊆ obsNetHubs[{connectionOrigin(c)}]
∧ obsNetConnections[{c}] ⊆ obsNetHubs[{connectionDestination(c)}]
prop4 ∀c · c ∈ Connections ⇒ connectionOrigin(c) 6= connectionDestination(c)
prop5 ∀h,c · h ∈ Hubs ∧ c ∈ hubConnections(h) ⇒ obsNetConnections[{c}]⊆obsNetHubs[{h}]
prop6 ∀c· c ∈ Connections ⇒ card(obsNetConnections[{c}])=1
prop7 ∀h· h ∈ Hubs ⇒ card(obsNetHubs[{h}])≥1
type7 isSharedHub ∈ Hubs → B
prop8 ∀h· h ∈ Hubs ∧ card(obsNetHubs[{h}])>1 ⇒ isSharedHub(h) = TRUE
prop9 ∀h· h ∈ Hubs ∧ card(obsNetHubs[{h}])=1 ⇒ isSharedHub(h) = FALSE
tech4 finite (obsNetConnections)
tech5 finite (obsNetHubs)
prop10 ∀n· n ∈ Nets ⇒ card(obsNetHubs−1[{n}])≥2 ∧ card(obsNetConnections−1[{n}])≥1
type8 areConnectedHubs ∈ Hubs × Hubs → B
END
Fig. 5. Context Net
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travel =̂
REFINES
travel
ANY
vehicle
newLocation
WHERE
grd1 vehicle ∈ Vehicles
grd2 newLocation ∈ hubLocations
grd3 newLocation 6= location(vehicle)
grd4 areConnectedHubs(obsHubLocations−1(location(vehicle))
7→obsHubLocations−1(newLocation))=TRUE
THEN
act1 location (vehicle):=newLocation
END
Fig. 6. First refinement
position (vehicle) ∈ obsHubLocations(connectionOrigin(r(1))) ∧
newPosition ∈ obsHubLocations(connectionDestination(r(card(r))))
Fig. 7. Second refinement
A variant card(hubsToCross)+card(connectionsToTraverse) is also specified to
prevent these events from happening forever. Event startTravel, on the other hand,
sets the starting conditions for travel.
The traversePath event, shown by Fig. 8, is expressed with the help of the follow-
ing guards: The vehicle is currently positioned on the origin hub of a path and that hub
has already been crossed. The destination hub of the path has not already been crossed.
The path connecting both hubs is the member element of the route the vehicle needs to
travel and has not already been traversed by the vehicle. If all of these guards are true
then the position of the vehicle can be set as destination hub of the path and the path
can be subtracted from the connectionsToTraverse variable.
The specification of the crossHub event is trivial. Following guards can be set in
order to trigger this event: The vehicle should currently be positioned on the hub which
it needs to cross and, moreover, that hub should not already be crossed by this vehicle.
If these guards are true then this hub can be subtracted from the list of those hubs which
need to be crossed by this vehicle. Figure 9 shows the event crossHub.
Notice that a variable position has replaced the variable location in these events.
Though both variables represent the same phenomenon yet they are specified with dif-
ferent variables because they belong to different levels of abstraction. At abstract level
location refers to the initial and final position of the vehicle and at lower level of
abstraction the variable position is used to represent the intermediate position of the
vehicle. This point will be discussed in more details in observation section.
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traversePath =̂
ANY
vehicle
r
p
newPosition
WHERE
grd1 vehicle ∈ Vehicles
grd2 r ∈ routes
grd3 p ∈ paths ∧ p ∈ ran(r)
grd4 position (vehicle) ∈ obsHubLocations(connectionOrigin(p))
grd5 newPosition ∈ obsHubLocations(connectionDestination(p))
grd6 newPosition 6= position(vehicle)
grd7 vehicle 7→p ∈ connectionsToTraverse
grd8 vehicle 7→connectionOrigin(p) /∈ hubsToCross
grd9 vehicle 7→connectionDestination(p) ∈ hubsToCross
THEN
act1 position (vehicle) := newPosition
act2 connectionsToTraverse := connectionsToTraverse\{vehicle7→p}
END
Fig. 8. Event traversePath
crossHub =̂
ANY
vehicle
hub
WHERE
grd1 vehicle ∈ Vehicles
grd2 hub ∈ Hubs
grd3 position (vehicle) ∈ obsHubLocations(hub)
grd4 vehicle 7→hub ∈ hubsToCross
THEN
act1 hubsToCross := hubsToCross\{vehicle7→hub}
END
Fig. 9. Event crossHub
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4.5 Fourth Refinement
This fourth refinement corresponds to the third level of abstraction. The rationale for
this abstraction leap is to specify the crossHub event at a fine-grained level. In fact, we
want to express the collision avoidance property for vehicles and for this, we control the
entrance of vehicles to the hub. In order to do so, the crossHub event is decomposed
into three further events: enterHub, leaveHub and wait. To facilitate the specification
of these events a new invariant is specified known as hubLoad. HubLoad indicates cur-
rent load of vehicles on a hub. It is specified that each hub is capable to host a certain
number of vehicles simultaneously which is given by a constant hubCapacity. The
variant hubLoad guarantees that a vehicle would not enter into a hub, if a hub is already
full.
An event enterHub (Fig. 10) is triggered when a vehicle enters into a hub whose
hubLoad is lower than its capacity and is also not previously traversed by the vehicle.
Once the event is triggered, the load of the hub is increased according to the number
of vehicles. A vehicle must not enter into the hub if the load of the hub is equal to its
capacity. In this scenario, it must wait for its turn. The event wait (Fig. 11) shows this
case.
enterHub =̂
ANY
vehicle
hub
newPosition
WHERE
grd1 vehicle ∈ Vehicles
grd2 hub ∈ Hubs
grd3 position (vehicle)=obsHubLocations(hub)
grd4 vehicle 7→ hub ∈ hubsToCross
grd5 newPosition ∈ obsHubLocations(hub)
grd6 hubLoad(hub)<hubCapacity(hub)
THEN
act1 position (vehicle) := newPosition
act2 hubLoad(hub) := hubLoad(hub) + 1
END
Fig. 10. Event enterHub
Wait =̂
ANY
vehicle
hub
WHERE
grd1 vehicle ∈ Vehicles
grd2 hub ∈ Hubs
grd3 position (vehicle)=obsHubLocations(hub)
grd4 vehicle 7→hub ∈ hubsToCross
grd6 hubLoad(hub)≥hubCapacity(hub)
THEN
act1 position (vehicle):=position(vehicle)
END
Fig. 11. Event wait
The event leaveHub, as shown by Fig. 12 triggers when a vehicle leaves a hub
which is already crossed by it. Upon the triggering of this event, the load of the hub is
decreased according to the number of vehicles which leave the hub.
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leaveHub =̂
ANY
vehicle
hub
newPosition
WHERE
grd1 vehicle ∈ Vehicles
grd2 hub ∈ Hubs
grd3 position (vehicle) ∈ obsHubLocations(hub)
grd4 vehicle 7→hub /∈ hubsToCross
grd5 newPosition /∈ obsHubLocations(hub)
grd6 position (vehicle) 6=newPosition
THEN
act1 position (vehicle) := newPosition
act2 hubLoad(hub) := hubLoad(hub)−1
END
Fig. 12. Event leaveHub
5 Event-B Hierarchy
Figure 13 presents an Event-B hierarchy of the domain model. It contains all the con-
texts and machines specified in the model. Important point to be noticed about the hier-
archy is its three column format and indication of abstraction leaps.
The first column of the hierarchy shows the series of refinements of machines. These
machines build the main construct of the model. Second column depicts the refinements
of StartState contexts. These contexts contain the starting values of the variables used
in the machines and hence are deployed for initialization purposes. Third column of the
hierarchy is constituted of series of refinements of Net context. These contexts specify
the supporting infrastructure for the travel event.
Figure 13 also indicates three different levels of abstraction. The first four rows
of the hierarchy belongs to the first level of abstraction and the fifth and sixth rows
belong to the second and third levels of abstraction respectively. The abstraction leaps
are indicated with line separators. Whenever abstraction leap or refinement demands
introduction of new supporting infrastructure, a new refinement of context Net and
context StartState is added to the model.
Following is the list of proof obligations which were generated to validate and to
ensure the correctness of the specification:
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Fig. 13. The Event-B hierarchy
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Total Automatic Manual
Net 8 7 1
Net1 4 4 0
Net2 5 5 0
Net3 2 2 0
Vehicle 0 0 0
Location 0 0 0
StartState 3 3 0
Machine0 3 3 0
Machine1 1 1 0
Machine2 4 3 1
Machine3 15 14 1
Machine4 26 25 1
Naturally, the number of proof obligations increases when more details are added
to models in refinement steps. The majority of proof obligations were automatically
discharged by the prover and rest were discharged interactively.
6 Preliminary lessons
Domain modeling differs from system specification in several ways: we must express,
straightforwardly, many properties which are part of the existing world, we refine less
towards concrete implementation than towards finer analysis of properties, and we have
a different criterion for stoping refinement.
Since Event-B and Rodin were not designed for domain modeling, so, we expect
to confront with difficulties when using them for this task, hoping for revelation of
interesting issues. Though, our work is still in its infancy stages, yet, some questions
have already been raised regarding the tool, the language, and the formalization process.
Rodin has some minor annoyances which slow us down, for example, the number
of straightforward proofs which require intervention from the user. Although they are
discharged in just one or two clicks but this is distracting and time consuming. It also
implies that after a crash (not frequent, but they happen) everything is to be typed again.
The major problem we have experienced with Rodin concerns inconsistent axioms.
At present, Rodin does not warn when a model is logically inconsistent. We discover it
when proofs become suspiciously easy to carry out. Although that may be difficult to
implement, yet, we would appreciate if Rodin raises a flag when an inconsistent model
appears. Our current solution to this problem is to include a theorem such as TRUE =
FALSE at context levels. A successful proof is a sure indication of inconsistency2. The
detection of inconsistencies is a crucial problem when modeling domains. Contexts are
used to represent the fixed structures and properties of a real situation. So, they contain
a rich but intricate set of logical formulas. As seen on Fig.5, the simple statement,
that transportation networks are graphs with minimal properties, requires more than 20
axioms which raises the probability of introducing subtle inconsistencies.
We deal with some issues regarding the Event-B language as well. The presentation
of axioms as a long list, in Event-B, is inconvenient. While this presentation makes
sense at the mathematical level, it has drawbacks at the usability level. Looking at the
axioms, we can see three categories: typing axioms, technical axioms (non emptiness,
2 Note that the theorem should be eliminated from the context afterwards, otherwise, even if not
proved, it will introduce an inconsistency in the machines that see it.
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finiteness, definition of standard structures, etc.), and the real properties. Since the work
of specifier is mainly about "fixing" the expression of the properties, so, it would be
easier if the corresponding axioms could be visually isolated from others.
The lack of sequences, and, more generally, of the few usual algorithmic structures,
implies they must be redefined each time they are required. This, in turn, makes the
axioms list grow longer.
Our modeling process uses two different operations for specification evolution: the
usual refinements and the abstraction leaps. The latter can be seen as the decomposition
of a large event as a sequence of smaller ones. For instance, travel is decomposed as
a sequence of traversePath an crossHub. Technically, there is no refinement rela-
tionship between these events, however conceptually, the abstraction leaps allow us to
introduce a hierarchical structure into the specifications. We define which small events
are decompositions of a large event. This hierarchical decomposition raises several is-
sues:
– All the notions should be formally redefined at the new level, even if they are in-
tuitively same. For instance, though the position of a vehicle on a network is the
same notion at all three levels of our model, yet we need to introduce three different
formal functions to model it having exactly same type. Although, the oblivion to
redefine something will be caught through the impossibility to discharge a proof
obligation, yet, it would be nice to have some support from the language or the
tools to remind us.
– Determining the correctness of decomposition is difficult. For a decomposition to
be correct, we need to be sure that a sequence of small events is equivalent to the
large event in the sense that the latter is observed after a definite sequence of the
former has been triggered. At present, we use the notions of variants and conver-
gent events. They allow us to prove that no event will be observed indefinitely, but
they do not allow us to prove that the certain event of the sequence will be ob-
served. Also, it should be noted that we had to introduce non convergent events:
startTravel and wait. The first event is an initialization, technically necessary
for the expression of the guards and intuitively motivated by the modeling of the
situation of "starting a journey". Wait is actually necessary to represent a reality of
the domain: when two vehicles are in proximity of collision at an intersection, one
has to stop. A formal property we may like to express is that the number of wait
events is finite, which cannot be done in a simple way.
– Is it advisable to state all properties of a model as a provable logical formula? This
question was raised by the finite waiting constraint we mentioned above. By intro-
ducing such a constraint in the domain at the development level we have reached,
we may do much more than what we intend. In fact, we may imply the existence of
a super-controller of the domain which has a knowledge of the global state of the
domain. This is fine for domains such as rail transportation systems where a global
supervisor is assumed from the beginning. This is fine also for domains such as air
transportation systems where the vehicles have a very limited waiting capacity: a
global control system is a logical necessity. This is not fine for a domain such as
road transportation. There, each vehicle is assumed to act according to a limited
perception of the local environment. The point is that we should be careful about
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the nature of the properties we express. For some, the proof techniques of event-B
are adequate; we should prove that the domain model is collision-free! For others,
probabilistic or optimization techniques may be more appropriate.
Until now, the general philosophy of event-B has been well suited to our purpose.
The notions of events and non determinism allow us easy modeling of independent vehi-
cles without any assumption other than their common property: they move. The strong
safety constraint we have considered is also easily modeled. This was done through
standard refinement techniques. We are thus encouraged to proceed further.
As a future work, we intend to include several types of vehicles. In particular, we
want to study how the platoons of vehicles impact our model. Another direction is the
introduction of the dynamic properties of vehicles, such as, other kinds of collisions,
oscillation, travel time, and etc.
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